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1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
The pursuit of efficiency improvement is the main motivation for reform and incentive- 
based regulation of infrastructure and network industries such as electricity, gas, water, 
and  telecommunications.  The  expectation  is  that  incentive  regulation  mechanisms 
would provide more powerful incentives for regulated firms to deliver the objectives of 
regulators (Joskow, 2005). 
 
In theory, regulators would be expected to pursue three forms of efficiency of the 
regulated firms (Coelli et al., 2003). Firstly, the operation of regulated firms should take 
into consideration the opportunity cost of scarce resources to the society and hence, 
move as close as possible to the production frontier – i.e. regulated firms need to be 
technically efficient. Secondly, where feasible, regulated firms are required to use 
optimum mix of inputs (or outputs) to produce a given level and quality of output with 
minimum cost (or maximise revenue) – i.e. regulated activities should be “allocative 
efficient”1. Thirdly, regulation should incentivise firms to undertake innovation, make 
sufficient investment, promote their technical level and improve their management 
practices to smoothly address future challenges. In other words, regulators need to 
ensure that the firms are also “dynamically efficient”. 
 
Investment and innovation are the key factors in addressing the future challenges of 
industries. This is particularly the case in a capital intensive sector such as the electricity 
networks. Thus an important challenge for the sector regulators is to ensure sufficient 
and efficient investments and innovation in the natural monopoly utilities. In other 
words, regulators need to promote the dynamic efficiency in regulated firms. However, 
until recently the dynamic aspect of efficiency analysis was absent from the efficiency 
and productivity literature and, in particular, in the context of the regulated industries 
(Serra et al., 2011). 
 
This paper introduces the concept of dynamic efficiency under incentive regulation with 
ex-post regulatory treatment of investments using the case of electricity distribution 
networks in Norway. We show that incentive regulatory models based on the total cost 
benchmarking are problematic for investment and optimal inter-temporal accumulation 
of capital of regulated firms. This is because it induces an autoregressive process in the 
level  of  technical  efficiency  and  exposes  the  firms  to  financial  loss  following 
investment and capital stock adjustment. The paper demonstrates that, in a given period, 
technical inefficiency of regulated utilities is a combination of period-specific effects 
 
 
1  This condition requires a behavioural assumption of profit maximisation (or cost minimisation) which 
might not be valid in regulated industries. As Coelli et al (2003) states, in practice, regulators often 
disregard allocative efficiency in their efficiency analysis because it is difficult to achieve in regulated 
utilities. Input mix allocative efficiency is ignored because capital intensity of network companies is 
determined by population density. Output mix allocative efficiency is not considered because regulated 
companies rarely have the ability to change their output mix (e.g., mix of different customer categories). 
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(shocks) and a carry-over component from previous periods. The latter component is 
due to the sluggish adjustment of outputs in the presence of investment and the 
associated adjustment costs. Additionally, we estimate these two components of 
inefficiency along with the rate of inefficiency transmission across periods (adjustment 
towards the long run equilibrium). 
 
The next section provides a theoretical framework for the effect of adjustment cost and 
incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks on the dynamics of inefficiency. 
Section 3 discusses the empirical model adopted to estimate the two components of 
inefficiency (i.e., period specific shock and carry-over). The empirical results are 
presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides the conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
2.  Theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
In this section we develop a simple framework to describe the process of capital stock 
adjustment  of  a  firm  and  its  effect  on  evolution  of  inefficiency  under  incentive 
regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment such as (1). 
𝑅��𝑡  = ��𝑡 + ��(��∗ − 𝐶 )
 (1)
 
The relation in (1) presents a generic form of incentive regulation model with ex-post 
regulatory treatment of investments where 𝑡  indexes time periods, 𝑅��𝑡    is 
regulated 
∗ 
revenue, ��𝑡   is the actual costs  and 
��𝑡 
∗ 
is the efficient cost obtained from efficiency 
analysis of regulated firms (i.e., 
��𝑡 = ��𝑡 ��𝑡  where ��𝑡  is the technical  efficiency of the 
firm)2. The actual cost includes capital expenditures and other costs (operation and 
maintenance, etc.). With incentive regulation we refer to those regulatory regimes in 
which the revenue of the firm is partially (or totally) decoupled from its actual (own) 
cost depending on the magnitude of power of incentive 𝜆 in (1)3. This amounts to a non- zero value for 𝜆 within its feasible boundary (0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1). 
 
As the revenue of firm is linked to the technical efficiency hence, the incentive 
regulatory model in (1) promotes an indirect competition among regulated firms to 
reduce their inputs for given levels of outputs or maximise the outputs for a given input 
set (Müller et al. 2010). 
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2  The aim of this regulatory model is to incentivise efficiency improvement in regulated utilities. In 
theory, a higher than optimum level of cost (��𝑡 ) means revenue loss to the firm. Thus, the regulated 
firms 
have incentive to move as closely as possible to the production frontier (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013a). 3  Depending on the value of λ, the model in (1) represents an spectrum of incentive regulations ranges from a high powered incentive regulation (i.e. λ = 1) where the firm’s cost is fully decoupled from the revenue of firm to a low powered incentive regulation (i.e., λ = 0 ) where the firm revenue is the same as 
the actual cost ( i.e., rate of return regulation). 
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Under the ex-post regulatory model of investment treatment the regulator does not 
interfere directly with the investment level of regulated firms. The regulator, however, 
evaluates the companies’ performance, ex-post, using benchmarking techniques and sets 
their allowed revenues based on their deviation from the sector best practice. In this 
approach, the effect of investment behaviour of regulated firms will be reflected in their 
efficiency with the consequence for their revenue. 
 
Poudineh and Jamasb (2013a) show that, under the incentive regulation model in (1), 
firms need to achieve a certain level of technical efficiency, following investment, in 
order to avoid cost disallowance in the benchmarking exercise. This level of efficiency, 
termed “no impact efficiency”, depends on the investment level (𝐼��), cost and technical efficiency  of  the  firm  before  investment  (i.e. ��1   and  ��1    respectively)  and  can  be 
presented as in (2) (see Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013a). 
 
��∗ = ��1 ��1+𝐼𝑛 
��1 +𝐼𝑛  (2) 
 
 Alternatively, it can be shown that there is an optimal level of investment (𝐼��∗), for a given level of no impact efficiency (��∗), which can be obtained by solving  (2) with respect to 𝐼𝑛 as in (3). 
𝐼��∗  = ��1 (𝑒  −��1 ) 1−𝑒 ∗ ��∗  ≠ 1 (3) 
 
As seen from (3), as no impact efficiency moves towards unity (though never equals 
one), the optimum level of investment for the firm will be higher. In practice, the 
regulated  firm  neither  observes  nor  can  choose  the  level  of  no  impact  efficiency 
whereas it only adjusts the investment level (and other costs). However, the firm knows 
that high level of investment involves the risk of cost disallowance because it requires a 
higher level of efficiency achievement following investment. Moreover, as shown in 
Poudineh and Jamasb (2013a), in a static setting, the lower than optimum level of 
investment can increase other costs of the firm and hence, reduces efficiency in the 
benchmarking process which consequently will be reflected in its revenue. 
 
Therefore, the firm conjectures the optimum level of investment, given its current level 
of efficiency. The capital accumulation process follows the following relation: 
∗ = (1 − ��)��∗ + 𝐼��∗ (4) ����+1 𝑡 𝑡 
 
where 𝐾 is the stock of capital of the firm, 𝜑 is the depreciation rate of capital and the 
star superscript indicates optimally. In theory, deviation from the optimum investment 
level  (i.e.,  under-  or  over-investment),  under  the  incentive  model  in  (1),  will  be 
translated into a cost to the firm in the form of efficiency loss. Thus, the regulated firm 
has an incentive to adjust the level of capital stock employed in the production process. 
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However, there are two barriers to the full and fast adjustment of capital stock towards 
the optimum level. First, the firm needs to take into consideration the revenue effect of 
investments  and  possible  cost  disallowance  in  the  benchmarking  practice.  This  is 
because the firm carries out investment based upon an ex-ante prediction of optimum 
level of investment. However, the firm’s actual investment can turn out to be lower or 
higher than the optimum level following the ex-post efficiency benchmarking (for a 
detailed discussion see Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013a). Second, the adjustment costs as a 
result of changing capital stock (e.g., cost of installation, disturbing production process, 
and personnel training, etc.) manifest themselves as reduced output or resource cost and 
lead to sluggish capital stock adjustment.4. Adjustment costs are often modelled as 
either explicit resource cost or as output-reducing cost incurred by firms as a result of 
diversion of resources from production to investment support activities (Silva and 
Stefanou, 2007). 
 
Therefore, in any regulatory period, the firm’s objective (with regard to investment) is 
to minimise the cost of deviation from the optimum capital stock, as well as, the cost of 
adjustment. In the context of incentive regulated firms, it is reasonable to assume that 
adjustment cost appears as a resource cost to the firm rather than an output-reducing 
cost. This is because output is determined by demand which is exogenous and hence, 
the utilities adjust their input to deliver a given level of output and service quality. 
 
Following Pereira (2001) we adopt a loss function to represent the regulated firm’s 
decision for investment and capital level. Within this framework, the firm minimises the 
expected sum of future adjustment cost and the cost of deviation from the optimal path 
of capital stock, which are discounted appropriately, subject to a capital accumulation 
process as follows: 
 
∞ 
∗ 2 2 
𝑀��𝑛 ��𝑡 � �� 𝑖 [(����+𝑖 
− ����+𝑖 ) 
��=0 
+ ��(𝐼����+𝑖 )  ] 
�� . 𝑡 ����+��+1  − ����+𝑖  = ����+𝑖 − ������+𝑖 (5)
 
where  0 < 𝜂 < 1   is  the  discount  factor  and  ��(𝐼����+𝑖 )2    is  a   quadratic  
function
 representing the adjustment cost with 𝑏 denoting the importance of adjustment cost in
 disequilibrium cost. ��𝑡  is the expectation operator conditional on available information set to the firm at time ��.
 
Using discrete time calculus of variations, the first order condition for the dynamic 
optimisation problem in (5) will lead to the Euler equation in (6), which shows the 
optimal path for capital stock (Pereira, 2001). 
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4  In this analysis we do not consider external adjustment costs which are related to market for capital 
goods (i.e., monopsony in the market for supply of capital goods). 
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−1 𝑡 ��−1 𝑡 
𝑡 
1 2 1   2 
∗ 
�(1−��)2 +��−1 +��−1 � 1  𝑏 ∗ (6) ��𝑡 
����+1  − 𝐾  + 𝐾 = − 𝐾 (1−��) 𝜂 (1−��) 
 
Using a simplifying assumption of zero depreciation rate (𝜑 = 0) and the conditional 
expectation operator converts (7) into the following: 
 
���2 + ����−1 + 1� 𝐸 𝐾 = −��−1 𝐸 ��∗ (7) 
𝜂 𝑡 ��−1 𝑡    𝑡 
 
where 𝜁 = −[1 + ��−1 + ��−1 ] < 0 and 𝐵 represents an operator defined as ��−𝑗 
��𝑡 ��𝑡  = 
��𝑡 ����+𝑗 .
 
The equation (7) can be further decomposed into its factors as follows: 
 (��1 − ��−1 )(��2 − ��−1 )��𝑡 ����−1 = 
−��−1 ��𝑡 ��∗ (8) 
 
where 𝜃  + 𝜃   = −𝜁 and 𝜃 𝜃   = 1. As the summation and multiplication of roots are 
𝜂 positive we can conclude that the roots ��1  and ��2  are both positive. Furthermore, 
Pereira
 (2001) shows that one of these roots is smaller than unity and the other is beyond the 
unit root circle. The solution of (8) with respect to the unstable root, say ��2 , will lead 
to 
the equation of motion for capital stock in (9): 
 
∞ 
∗ 
��𝑡  = ��1����−1 + ��1 ����−1 
�(��1��)𝑖 ��𝑡 ����+𝑖 
��=0 
(9) 
If  we  multiply both  sides  of  (9)  with  (��−1 − 1)  a  similar  equation  of  motion  for
 investment can be obtained as follows: 
 
∞ 
∗ 
��𝑡  = ��1����−1 + ��1 ����−1 
�(��1 ��)𝑖 ��𝑡 ����+𝑖 
��=0 
(10) 
where ��𝑡  = ����+1  − ��𝑡 and ��𝑡 = ����+1 ∗ − ��𝑡 ∗.5 
 
Therefore,  the  level  of  capital  (or  investment),  in  the  current  period,  is  directly 
influenced by its value in the previous period and also with the current and expected 
future levels of optimum capital (investment). In other words, the equation of motion, 
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for capital (investment) of the regulated firm, follows an autoregressive process. 
 
The presence of an autoregressive process in capital (or investment) evolution induces a 
similar relationship in the technical inefficiency of the firm. Figure 1 presents 
schematically, the technical, allocative and economic efficiency of a firm. It assumes 
that the firm uses two inputs (capital (K) and other input (L)) to produce a single output. 
 
 
 
5 Recall that depreciation has been assumed to be zero for simplicity in governing the equations. 
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The isoquant ���� ′   represents the production frontier. The line 𝐶�� ′ , on  the  other 
hand, 
shows the minimum cost mix of inputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Technical, allocative and economic efficiency 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Given that point 𝐴 is the observed performance of a firm, the technical efficiency can be 
defined as 𝑇�� = 
��𝐵 
��𝐴 
and allocative efficiency is 𝐴�� = ����. 
��𝐵 
 
Economic efficiency, on the other hand, is the product of technical and allocative 
efficiency as follows: 
��𝐸 = 𝑇�� × 𝐴�� = ��𝑅 
��𝐴  (11) 
 
As stated previously an autoregressive process in capital will lead to a similar process in 
state of firm’s technical inefficiency. 
It is clear from figure (1) that 𝑂�� = ���∗ 2 + ��∗ 2  where ��∗ and ��∗  shows 
efficient levels 
of capital and other input. Similarly, 𝑂�� = √��2 + ��2  where 𝐾  follows the 
process in
 (9). 
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��∗2  
By defining technical efficiency as 𝑇�� = exp(−��𝑡 ), where ��𝑡  is the inefficiency 
level, 
we obtain: 
 
��𝐵 ���∗2 +��∗2 1 ��2 +��2 ��𝑡  = − log(𝑇��) = − log ������ = − log �  √��2 +��2  � = 2 
log � 
� (12)
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and   𝐿𝑆 = 𝐿 
��= �� 
2 
 
which can be further simplified to: 
  1  𝐾    2 ��𝑡  = 2 log[(
��∗
) × KS + LS] (13) 
 
where 𝐾𝑆 = 1 2 2 +𝐿  2. 1+ 𝐿∗ 
��∗2 ��
∗ ∗ 
If we substitute from (9) into (13) we will have: 
 1 ��1 ����−1 +��1 
����−1 ∑∞ (��1 ��)𝑖 ��𝑡 ��∗ 2 ��𝑡  = 2 log[( ��∗ ) × KS + LS] (14) 
 
which can be rearranged as in (15). 
 
 
  1 ��1 
����−1    2 (��1 ����−1 ∑∞   (��1 ��)𝑖 ��𝑡 ��∗    )2 +2(��1 ����−1 )(��1 ����−1 ∑∞   (��1 ��)𝑖 ��𝑡 ��∗    ) ��=0 ��+𝑖 ��=0 ��+𝑖 ��𝑡  = 2 log{ 
� 
(15) 
��∗      
� 
KS + LS + ��∗2 KS} 
  1 ����−1   2 As, ����−1  = 2 log[( 
��∗   ) KS + LS], the relation in (15) clearly shows that inefficiency in 
the  current  period  is  correlated  with  inefficiency  in  the  previous  period.  The 
econometric version of this relation for ����−1 
is:
 
��𝑡  = 𝛼 + (1 − ��)����−1 + ��𝑡 (16)
 
where  𝛼  is  a  constant,   ��𝑡   is  a  random  shock  to  the  level  of  the  current  
period
 inefficiency  and  1 − 𝜓  shows  persistence  of  inefficiency6   (i.e.,  𝜓  is  the  speed  of
 adjustment of inefficiency). 
The term 𝛼 + (1 − ��)����−1   in (16) is the expected value of ��𝑡   given ����−1 
. In other 
words,  given  the  previous  level  of  inefficiency  and  presence  of  an  autoregressive 
process, firm inefficiency is expected to be composed of a constant term (��), and  its inefficiency  in  the  previous  period  (����−1 )  which  is  partially  adjusted   (−������−1). However, in practice, the observed level of inefficiency can be higher or lower than the 
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expected  value  due  to  period  specific  shocks  (i.e.  ��𝑡 ).  These  shocks  have  a  
zero 
expectation and cause the firm inefficiency to deviate from its expected path. Ann and 
Sickles (2000) attribute these shocks to emergence of new technologies, regulation or 
deregulation and changes in behaviour of competitors. Investment also is an important 
factor that  creates  period  specific shock  to  the  current  level  of inefficiency which 
persists over subsequent periods. 
 
It is evident from (16) that inefficiency transmission across periods exists only when 
𝜓 ≠ 1. A value between zero and unity (0 < 𝜓 < 1) means that the rate of inefficiency
 
6 The value of 𝜓 can be different for every observation. The empirical model in the next section is setup 
to enable an observation specific estimation of  
��.
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transmission is diminishing as time passes. Under this condition, a higher 𝜓 (or a lower 1 − ��) implies a faster adjustment towards the long run equilibrium and a lower level of
 inefficiency persistence. On the contrary, a lower 𝜓 implies prolonged persistence  of
 inefficiency and hence; inability of producers to optimise their cost quickly. A value of 
𝜓 = 0, on the other hand, implies that there is no tendency for inefficiency to  revert 
back to an equilibrium point. 
 
Although, in the short run, inefficiency of firm depends on the past value, in the long 
run it only depends on the value of 𝛼 and ��. If 0 < 𝜓 < 1 and ��𝑡   is  a white 
noise 
process, the expected long run inefficiency would be  𝛼   7. 
𝜓 
 
Therefore, in any given period, technical inefficiency has two components. One element 
is related to period-specific effects (��𝑡 ) and the other is the inefficiency carried  over from previous periods (𝛼 + (1 − ��)����−1). This implies that  inefficiencies which are 
related to sluggish adjustment of capital and the associated adjustment costs persist over 
time, without firms having much control over them in the short run. At the same time, 
the  incentive  regulation  model  in  (1)  penalises  and  rewards  firms  based  on  their 
observed levels of efficiency which, in effect, includes an uncontrollable component 
due to investment cycles. This is problematic for optimising investment and capital as it 
exposes the regulated firm to revenue loss. 
 
 
 
 
3.  Empirical model 
 
 
 
 
This  section  presents  a  parametric  method  to  estimate  the  two  components  of 
inefficiency and the rate of inefficiency transmission, across periods, as described in 
Section 3. Application of parametric methods to address the dynamic aspect of 
inefficiency is relatively new. Ahn and Sickles (2000) were the first to use a dynamic 
model to provide a structural explanation for variations in the efficiency levels of a firm. 
They assume that technical inefficiency evolves over time in an autoregressive manner 
due to the firm’s inability to adjust its efficiency in a timely manner. This model is 
reduced to a normal dynamic panel data model if the speed of inefficiency adjustment is 
assumed to be the same for all firms. Emvalomatis et al. (2011) use a similar dynamic 
efficiency model based on the standard stochastic distance function model, but allow the 
efficiency  scores  of  the  firms  to  be  correlated  through  time.  The  autocorrelated 
inefficiency model  is  developed  in  a state-space framework  and  nonlinear Kalman 
 
 
 
7    Proof:  a  recursive  substitution  of  (16)  gives ��𝑡  = (1 − ��)𝑛 ����−𝑛 + 
𝛼[∑𝑛 (1 − ��)𝑖 ] + [∑𝑛 (1 − ��=0 
��)𝑖 ����−𝑖 ]. On the other hand ��( ��𝑡 )= (1 − ��)𝑛 ��(����−𝑛 )+ 𝛼[∑��−1(1 − 
��)𝑖 ] because 𝜀 
��=0 
is assumed to be a 
13 
 
��=1 𝑡 
𝛼 𝛼 white noise process, and ��(��𝑡 ) = 0. Thus the cumulative effect when 𝑛 → ∞ is: ��( ��𝑡 ) = 1−(1−��) = ��.
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filtering is used to evaluate the likelihood function and obtain the technical efficiency 
scores. 
 
Tsionas  (2006)  proposes  a  stochastic  frontier  model  that  allows  for  technical 
inefficiency effects and dynamic technical inefficiency by adopting Bayesian inference 
procedures based on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques. Emvalomatis 
(2012) considers the implications of stochastic frontier models with autocorrelated 
inefficiency in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. The study specifies random- 
and correlated random-effects models and proposes a Bayesian estimation approach to 
measure dynamic efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Model development 
 
Following the approach in Coelli and Perelman (1996) we define an input distance 
function as follows: 
 
��𝐼 (�� , �� , ��) = 𝑚��𝑥 ���: ���� ∈ ��(��)� (17) 
𝛾 
where ��(��) represents the set of input vectors 𝑥 ∈ ��𝑄 that can produce the output 
vector
 
𝑦 ∈ ��𝑀  in period 𝑡 and 𝛾 indicates the proportional reduction in a given input vector. If
 
𝑥 ∈ ��(��) then ��𝐼  ≥ 1 however, ��𝐼  = 1 if 𝑥 is on the frontier of the input 
requirements
 set. Technical efficiency is defined as 𝑇��𝑖𝑡  = 1/��𝐼 (�� , �� , ��). Taking the 
logarithm of
 both sides and imposing homogeneity of degree one in inputs by normalizing the 𝑄 − 1 inputs with respect to ��th. input leads to an econometric version of this relationship as
 in (18): 
 
𝐼 𝑥𝑞��𝑡 −��𝑜������𝑖𝑡  = 
��𝑜����𝑖𝑡 ��𝑥 𝑄��𝑡 
� , ��𝑚��𝑡 , ��� + ��𝑖𝑡  + log(𝑇��𝑖𝑡 ) (18) 
 
where ��𝑖𝑡   is a normally distributed idiosyncratic error term and  log(𝑇��𝑖𝑡 ) is the 
one 
sided  inefficiency  term  which  enters  the  equation  as  the  logarithm  of  technical 
efficiency. It can be seen that the logarithm of the distance function can be written in 
terms of an estimable linear function of ��𝑖𝑡 and a vector of coefficients 𝜷 as in (19). 
 
′ 𝜷 + 𝑣 + log(𝑇𝐸 ) (19) ��𝑖𝑡  = ��𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 
 
Following Emvalomatis et al. (2011), we assume an autoregressive process for the 
efficiency by making non-linear transformation of inefficiency as in (20)-(22)8. 
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8  This transformation is for estimation purpose and allows us to have observation specific inefficiency 
transmission. Thus, equation (21) is comparable to equation (16) in Section 3 in the following way 
(subscript 𝑖 is removed for simplicity): 
𝑑𝑧 = 1 − 𝜓 =  𝑑𝑧  ×  ����𝑡 × ������−1  = 𝑒𝑥��(����) 1 . 
������−1 ��
��𝑡 
����
��−1 
�����
�−1 
(1+𝑒𝑥��(����))2 × 𝜌 × ����−1(1−����−1) 
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𝑢 
𝑢1 
1 
2 
𝑖 
𝑠 = log(  𝑇��𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 1−���
�𝑖𝑡 
) (20) 
 
��𝑖𝑡  = 𝛿𝛿 + ����𝑖��−1 + ��𝑖𝑡 ��𝑖𝑡 ~��(0, 
��2 ) (21)
 
��𝑖1  = ��1 + ��𝑖1 ��𝑖1 ~��(0, ��2  ) (22)
 
where ��𝑖𝑡  is the logarithm of ratio of efficiency to inefficiency and 𝜌 is an elasticity 
that
 measures  the  percentage  change  in  the  ratio  of  efficiency  to  inefficiency  that  is 
transferred from one period to the next. Equation (22) initialises the stochastic process 
and assumes stationarity. Stationarity also implies that, in the long run, the expected 
value of ��𝑖𝑡 , unconditional on ���� ,��−1 , is the same for all firms and the possible 
observed
 
differences are due to shocks or the difference in the stage of the path towards long run 
equilibrium. Under this condition (stationarity), the two additional parameters can be 
obtained by (23) and (24). 
𝜇   =   𝛿 (23) 1−𝜌 
 2    =   ��𝑢 ��𝑢1 1−��2 (24) 
 
If the process is not stationary the expected value of the firms’ efficiency, over time, 
tends towards unity or zero. Similarly, the expected value of ��𝑖𝑡  can  incline  
towards 
positive or negative infinity. As suggested in Tsionas (2006), it is unlikely that data is 
generated by a process with unit root, especially when efficiency approaches zero. This 
is because we normally expect inefficient firms to fall out of a competitive market or, in 
the case of regulated firms, suffer from financial losses as their revenue is directly 
linked with their efficiency level. Thus, the number of very inefficient firms will be 
small. Given stationarity, the long run efficiency can be obtained by (25)9. 
 
𝐿��𝑛�� ��𝑢�� 𝑇�� = 1/[1 + 
𝑒�� ��(−  𝛿 1−𝜌 )] (25) 
 
Following Emvalomatis (2012), we add a firm specific term ��𝑖   to (18) in  order  to account for unobserved heterogeneity among the firms, assuming ��𝑖 ~��(0, ��2). We 
 
 For the above relationship we have used ��𝑡  = 1 − 𝑇��𝑡  which is the same as ��𝑡  = −log(𝑇��𝑡 ) for low values   of   inefficiency.   This   is   because   based   on   the   Taylor    series   of   𝑒 −��𝑡 we   have: 
∞ 𝑒 −��𝑡  = � ��=0 (−��𝑡 )𝑛 ��! = 1 − ��𝑡 + 
��𝑡 2 2! ��𝑡 3 
− + ⋯ 
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𝑖𝑡 
3! and hence,  𝐿𝑖�� {𝑒 ��𝑡 }=1 − ��𝑡  because all the higher order terms will approach towards zero quickly   s ��𝑡  → 0. 9 Proof: We know sit  has the following process: ��𝑖�� = 𝛿𝛿 + ����𝑖��−1 + ��𝑖�� Thus, the long run value of ��𝑖��  is 
𝛿 1−𝜌 (the proof of this is exactly similar to the footnote 7) On the other hand we know that 
��𝑖𝑡 
is defined 
��𝐸𝑖𝑡
 ��𝐸𝑖��  𝛿 ��𝐸𝑖𝑡 as:��𝑖�� = 
𝑙𝑜��(1−��𝐸 ) Thus we can obtain the long run efficiency by: 𝑙𝑜�� � 1−��𝐸𝑖𝑡 � = hence, = 1−𝜌 1−��𝐸𝑖𝑡 
𝑒𝑥��( 𝛿   ) and therefore: 𝐿𝑜��𝑔 𝑟��𝑛 𝑇�� = 1/[1 + 𝑒𝑥 ��(−  𝛿   )]. 1−𝜌 1−𝜌 
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2𝜎 
𝑢 
𝑢1 𝑖1 
estimate the parameters of the hidden state model (21)10 and measurement equation (18) 
simultaneously using only the observed data in (18). 
 
In order to estimate the vector of all parameters, 𝜽 = [��,  ��𝑣 , 𝛿�� , ��, ��𝑢 ,  ��𝜔 ] ′ we set up the likelihood function by letting ��𝑖  denote the 𝑇 × 1 vector of the latent state variable for the firm 𝑖 as in (26). 
��(𝒚, {��𝑖 }, {��𝑖 }|��, 𝑿) =  ��(𝒚|{��𝑖 }, {��𝑖 }, �� , ��𝑣 , 𝑿) × 
��({��𝑖 }|, 𝛿�� , ��, ��𝑢 ) 
𝑁 ��−1 ′ 2 1 = 𝑁�� ��𝑥𝑝 �− ∑��=1 ∑��=0 (��𝑖𝑡 − ��𝑖 − 𝑿𝑖𝑡 𝛽 − ��𝑜��𝑇��𝑖𝑡 )  � 2��2 (2����𝑣 2) 2 1 ∑
𝑁 𝑢 (��𝑖1 − 𝛿��1)2 × 𝑁 ��𝑥𝑝 
�− (2����𝑢1 2) 2 
��=1 2 � 
𝑢1 
𝑁 ��−1 2 1 × (2����𝑢 2 ) 
��(��−1) � 𝑥𝑝 �− 2 
𝑁 ∑��=1 ∑��=1 ���𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − ������ ,��−1 �  � (26) 2��2 2 1 × 𝑁 ��𝑥𝑝 
�− 
∑��=1 ��𝑖 
� 2��
2 (2����𝜔 2 ) 2 𝜔 where 𝒚 and 𝑿 represent the vector and matrix of dependent and independent variables
 respectively and 𝛿��1  and ��2    are the mean and variance of 𝑠    in equation (22). The 
last
 term in likelihood function captures the heterogeneity effects. This likelihood function 
enables a simultaneous estimation of equations (18) and (21). 
The estimation is carried out in a Bayesian framework. For 𝜷 and 𝛿�� , normal priors 
are 
selected. For the variance parameters the inverted Gamma has been chosen because it is 
conjugate. Moreover, for 𝜌 a Beta prior has been used to restrict it in unit interval. In 
order  to  estimate  the  posterior  moments  of  the  model’s  parameters  a  posterior 
simulation based on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is employed. 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Data and model specification 
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The dataset used for the application is a balanced panel of 128 Norwegian electricity 
distribution networks observed from 2004 to 2010. All financial data are in real terms 
which are adjusted based on 2010 prices. The Norwegian distribution companies are 
working under incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment 
based on the formula (1). The power of incentive (��) in Norwegian regulatory model 
is 
currently 60% in order to motivate companies to move as close as possible to the 
efficient frontier. 
 
 
 
10 Equation (21) is called hidden (latent) state because we do not observe the data in this equation. 
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Following  the  Norwegian  energy  regulator,  we  construct  the  regulatory  asset  base 
(RAB) using the book value of capital stock plus 1% as working capital. The return on 
regulatory asset base is computed using the regulator rate of return11. Other variables 
include operational cost of network companies, number of customers and distributed 
energy. Number of customers reflects the total number of connected consumers to the 
grid including the holiday homes12. The summary of descriptive statistics of model 
variables is presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Operational cost (000’NOK) 𝑂����𝑥 878 854646 43244.95 88270.88 
Return on RAB (000’NOK) 𝐶𝑎𝑝��𝑥 0.113 263071 15366.9 31772.38 
Distributed energy (MWh) ��𝐸 6915 1.68e+07 561877 1575379 
Number of customers (#) 𝐶𝑈 18 544925 21115 55979.07 
 
 
The model specification for the application is a distance function that allows estimation 
in a multi-input multi-output context. The outputs in our model are energy distributed (𝐷��)  and  total  number  of  customers  (��𝑈��)  connected  to  the  grid.  Operational expenditures (��𝑝𝑒��) and return on regulatory asset base (𝐶𝑎������) are the two inputs. 
These variables are commonly used in efficiency analysis of electricity networks (e.g., 
Growitsch et al., 2012; Miguéis et al., 2011). Substituting the inputs and outputs into 
equation (18) and using operating costs as the normalising input leads to13: 
 
− log(𝑂������) = ��0 + ��1 log(����) + ��2 log(𝐶𝑈��) + 
��3 log(𝐶𝑎𝑝��𝑥 ∗) + 
1 
𝛽4 𝑙𝑜��2 (����) 2 
1 + ��5 𝑙𝑜��2(𝐶𝑈��) + 2 1 ��6 log2(𝐶𝑎𝑝����∗) + ��7 log(����) log(𝐶𝑈��) 2 1 + ��8 log(����) log(𝐶𝑎𝑝��𝑥 ∗) + ��9 log(𝐶𝑈��) log(𝐶𝑎𝑝��𝑥 ∗) + 
𝜔𝑖 + ��1 𝑡 + ��2 ��2 2 + ����𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜��𝑇����𝑡 (27) 
where 𝐶𝑎������∗  is the normalised 𝐶𝑎������, 𝑡 is time trend and 𝜔 is used to 
capture the
 unobserved  heterogeneity  in  the  operating  environment  of  the  firms.  Given  the 
possibility  of  the  presence  of  correlation  between  firm  effect  (��)  and  technical 
efficiency, two models are estimated based on the method proposed by Emvalomatis 
(2012). In the first model we assume that the firm specific effect is uncorrelated with 
technical efficiency (simple random effects). For the second model we take into account 
 
11 The regulator rate of return, currently, is 5.62% in Norway. 
12 The Norwegian regulator has separated holiday cottages from other customers as they have a different 
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load profile compared with conventional consumers. 
13 We used an input rather an output orientation when measuring efficiency to comply with consensus that 
in regulated utilities demand is exogenous. 
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the possibility of correlation between the firm specific effects with the independent 
variables using the technique in Mundlak (1978). For ease of interpretation of the first 
order terms, all data are divided by their sample mean prior to estimation. 
 
 
 
 
4.  Results and discussion 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Empirical results 
 
Table 2 presents the results, of the models estimated, based on the posterior means of 
the parameters and their standard deviation. The estimations include simple random 
effects (no correlation between firm specific effect and technical efficiency) and 
correlated random effects. All first order terms show consistent signs for the simple 
random effect model whereas only the coefficient of distributed energy has an 
unexpected sign for the correlated random effects model. Moreover, the parameters of 
the correlated random effects model are, on average, smaller compared with the simple 
random effects model. The first order parameters, in both models, can be interpreted as 
the elasticity of input with respect to outputs at the sample mean. 
 The estimated parameter 𝜌 is around 92% for both the simple and correlated random effect models which are quite similar and fairly high. The value of 𝜌 directly influences the rate if inefficiency transmission (1 − ��) (discussed in Section 2) across periods. We 
have used their relationship, as the way shown in Footnote 8, to obtain the rate of 
inefficiency transmission for each observation. Unlike 𝜌 which is constant for the whole sector inefficiency transmission rate (1 − ��) is observation specific and has a mean of 
88%. 
However, distribution of rate of inefficiency persistence (1 − ��) presented in figure 
2, 
shows significant variation at the level of individual companies. The small value shows 
short duration of problematic inefficiency persistence and hence, speedy adjustment. 
The large value of 1 − 𝜓 indicates that inefficiency transmission between periods has 
affected  the  performance  of  firms  significantly.  The  magnitude  of  inefficiency 
transmission rates are influenced by the scale of investment.  In any regulatory period, 
investment appears as a shock to the current level of firms’ inefficiency whose duration 
of inefficiency persistence depends on gestation period of the projects. In this way, 
firms remain under financial constraints due to inefficiency induced by investments. 
This effect exists until the firm reaches the long run equilibrium. The estimates of long 
run efficiency of the distribution networks under simple and correlated random effects 
are very close and, as seen from Table 2, approximately 82%. 
 
At the same time, figure 2 shows that majority of observations have rate of inefficiency 
transmissions which are less than one. This means inefficiency shocks fade-off over 
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time. However, few firms randomly show an inefficiency transmission rate higher than 
one however, it has not been persistent and hence, can be attributed to the observations 
far from point of approximation (mean). This is because a value of inefficiency 
transmission  rate  higher  than  one  suggests  that  the  firm  becomes  progressively 
inefficient over time something which is very unlikely under reward and penalty scheme 
of incentive regulation (because revenue is directly linked with efficiency as in (1)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of inefficiency transmission rate (𝟏 − ��)
 
 
Figure 3 presents the mean of decomposed inefficiencies for the whole sector and 
different years. Inefficiency decompositions include two terms: inefficiency carry-over 
from previous periods and period-specific inefficiency shocks which jointly construct 
the observed inefficiency of the period. It is worth noting that period-specific effects are 
different from uncontrollable noise that affect inefficiency, as our model controls for 
noise and unobserved heterogeneity14. As seen in Figure 3, the mean of period specific 
term can be positive, negative and zero in different years. For example, in 2004, the 
mean of observed inefficiency increased by about 2% with respect to its expected value 
as a result of the period-specific term. In the same way, the mean of observed 
inefficiency remained unchanged in 2009 and declined by around 1% in 2007. Cyclical 
investment is the most important factor in introducing positive period-specific shocks 
which persist over time. On the contrary, underinvestment, cost reducing measures, and 
innovative managerial practice can impact the period-specific term negatively. 
 
 14 The noise and unobserved heterogeneity are reflected in the idiosyncratic error term (��𝑖�� ) and the firm specific term (��𝑖 ), respectively, in equation 27. 
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Table 2: The posterior mean of parameters and their standard deviation15 
 
Simple random effects Correlated random effects 
 
Coefficient Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
��0 -6.678 (1.377) -1.280 (30.93) 
��1 0.777 (0.423) -0.065 (0.368) 
��2 0.652 (0.401) 0.857 (0.363) 
��3 1.594 (0.138) 1.648 (0.114) 
𝛽4 0.035 (0.040) 0.008 (0.031) 
��5 0.181 (0.011) 0.084 (0.017) 
��6 -0.127 (0.007) -0.131 (0.005) 
��7 -0.102 (0.024) -0.054 (0.023) 
��8 -0.044 (0.021) -0.003 (0.019) 
��9 0.014 (0.020) -0.023 (0.019) 
��1 -0.014 (0.002) -0.005 (0.003) 
��2 0.006 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) 
��𝑣 0.010 (0.001) 0.010 (0.001) 
𝛿𝛿 0.120 (0.019) 0.114 (0.023) 
𝜌 0.923 (0.011) 0.922 (0.014) 
��𝑢 0.254 (0.014) 0.229 (0.012) 
��𝜔 0.252 (0.019) 0.216 (0.015) 
𝐿𝑜��𝑔 𝑟��𝑛 𝑇�� 0.828 0.811 
 
 
At the same time, there are significant variations in the components of decomposed 
inefficiency at the level of individual firms. Figure 4, shows the distribution of 
inefficiency decomposition for each year. As it is evident from the figure, the share of 
components  of  inefficiency  in  constructing  the  observed  inefficiency  varies  across 
years. Some firms are affected considerably by period-specific shocks which are 
eventually reflected in their observed inefficiency. For instance, in 2004, a major share 
of observed inefficiency of the firms was related to the period-specific effects. These 
shocks again manifested themselves as increased share of inefficiency carry-over in 
2005 and 2006. It is only from 2007 that these carry-over effects start to decline though 
increased again in 2010. Although under the condition of stationarity these shocks fade- 
off over an infinite time horizon, in practice their residual effects remain in the observed 
inefficiency of the firms. 
 
 
 
 
15 For the ease of interpretation the coefficients of model variables are multiplied by -1. 
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Figure 3: Inefficiency decomposition in different years 
 
 
 
 
The intertemporal nature of the autoregressive process implies that one-time shocks can 
affect the value of evolving inefficiency far into future. In other words, the value of the 
current level of inefficiency is affected by past shocks because of investment or other 
reasons. In order to illustrate this, we have simulated the effect of period specific effects 
(shocks) on ����𝑡  using estimated parameters of autoregressive process in Equation 21. 
As
 
����𝑡  is related to inefficiency through Equation 20, this simulation can give an 
indication
 of the importance of period specific shocks for inefficiency. 
 
The effect of one time shock on subsequent years and the cumulative effects over 
infinite time horizon have been simulated assuming different level of shocks in 2004. 
These  are  consistent  with  the  distribution  of  period  specific  shocks  that  has  been 
������+𝑗 illustrated in Figure 3. The marginal effect can be obtained using 
��𝑢
𝑡 
= �� 𝑗   where 
𝑗 
denotes the length of time that separates a disturbance to input (��𝑖𝑡 ) and the 
observed 
value of the outputs (Hamilton, 1994). The sum of consequences for all futures values 
of ��𝑖𝑡   (cumulative effect),  as result of a transitory disturbance to  ��𝑖𝑡 , can  then 
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be 
∞     ������+𝑗 1 computed  from  ∑��=0    𝜕𝑢    = 1−𝜌 (Hamilton,  1994).  The  results  of  simulation  are 
presented in Table 3. 
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Year 
 
Shock 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 No. of periods 
needed to 
become <𝟏% Cumulative effects over infinite time 
𝑢 = 0.05 0.046 0.042 0.038 0.035 0.032 0.030 20 0.62 
𝑢 = 0.10 0.092 0.084 0.077 0.071 0.065 0.060 28 1.25 
𝑢 = 0.15 0.138 0.126 0.116 0.107 0.098 0.090 33 1.87 
𝑢 = 0.20 0.184 0.169 0.155 0.143 0.131 0.121 36 2.5 
𝑢 = 0.30 0.276 0.253 0.233 0.214 0.197 0.181 41 3.75 
𝑢 = 0.40 0.368 0.338 0.311 0.286 0.263 0.242 45 5 
𝑢 = 0.50 0.46 0.423 0.389 0.358 0.329 0.303 47 6.25 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of inefficiency decomposition in different years 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, the effect of a one-time shock carries over to subsequent years. 
Although, this effect diminishes over time, it takes many periods for it to decrease to 
less than 1% due to the high elasticity of transmission (��=0.92). For example, in  the case of ��=0.05, duration is around 20 periods and for the case of ��=0.50 it  takes 47 
periods. Moreover, the corresponding cumulative effects of these transitory shocks are 
62% and 625% respectively which are much higher than the initial perturbations. 
 
Table 3: The effect of one time shock on  𝒔𝒊𝒕 
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The figures show that historical shocks play a major role in the current and future level 
of firms’ productivity. Under the condition that the initial shock is due to investments, 
the scale and type of investment will impact the elasticity of inefficiency persistence. 
However, once inefficiency transmission begins, the process of adjustment is not under 
the control of the firm. This is against the very basic assumption of incentive regulation 
model in (1) which assumes that the evolution of inefficiency is entirely controllable 
and based upon that links the revenue of firm with the observed efficiency of firm. 
 
Unlike the long run efficiency which captures the dynamic aspect of firm behaviour, 
short run efficiency is an indicator of deviation from the static optimum frontier. Table 
4 presents the summary of short term efficiency statistics for each year studied. As 
shown, the range of efficiency distribution is fairly significant although the magnitudes 
of average efficiencies are very similar and relatively high. This implies that there is 
little  improvement  in  average  short  run  efficiency.  This  can  occur  due  to  several 
reasons. One explanation could be that under the incentives regime the immediate 
efficiency gains are achieved from operating costs (Muller et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, following capital expenditures some firms become inefficient. Hence, on average, 
operational efficiency gain in each period offsets the inefficiency induced by capital 
investment and thus, the average static efficiency of sector remains relatively stable. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Average of short run efficiencies 
 
Year Average Efficiency Min. Max. 
2004 0.801 0.483 0.926 
2005 0.799 0.431 0.926 
2006 0.802 0.409 0.922 
2007 0.815 0.356 0.928 
2008 0.820 0.463 0.922 
2009 0.822 0.403 0.921 
2010 0.815 0.427 0.917 
 
 
4.2 Regulatory challenges and the way forward 
 
The implication of persistent inefficiency is crucial for the incentive regulation based on 
(1) which currently being practised in Norway and other countries. Under this model of 
incentives regulation, efficiency loss is equivalent to revenue loss for firms. The theory 
behind the short run efficiency assumes that firms are profit maximisers and the 
regulatory regime implies that cost minimising is valid under all conditions. However, 
due to the presence of dynamic aspects in the firms’ decision concerning investments 
and innovation, static efficiency is an inadequate measure of investment behaviour and 
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performance of utilities. Therefore, ex-post regulatory treatment of investments through 
benchmarking total cost distorts the long run objectives of the firms and might expose 
firms to financial loss. Although, this approach has been adopted to deter 
overcapitalisation, considering asymmetric information between the firm and the 
regulator, it will not necessarily lead to an efficient level of investment. 
 
The implication of inefficiency persistence also concerns the case of innovation. 
Innovation is the outcome of firms’ efforts to produce new or improved products and 
services, introduce more efficient and productive design processes and implement 
organisational or managerial changes. Innovation generation and adoption by the firms 
depends, among other factors, on the market structure and the cost of resources. The 
innovative behaviour entails complementary investment to the more traditional R&D 
concept such as investment in innovation-related training and design, investment in 
machinery, equipment and software. However, these types of investments can induce a 
prolonged inefficiency and expose the distribution companies to substantial financial 
losses under the penalty and reward schemes of the incentives regime. 
 
This paper identifies the problems with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment 
however; the regulatory solution is not straightforward. This is because regulating the 
capital cost of the companies is the matter of trade-off between using information from 
the firm itself (i.e. project the cost) and from the peers (i.e. benchmark). An approach 
used by some sector regulators, to address the issue of quasi fixed input, is to exclude 
capital expenditures from the benchmarking models. That is to rely on firms’ own 
information regarding capital expenditure (Capex) and benchmark only operating cost 
(Opex)16. However, this approach received several criticisms. Burn and Riechmann 
(2004) argue that Capex and Opex should be treated equally because benchmarking 
only one cost category such as Opex and different treatment of Capex creates incentive 
for companies to transfer costs from the ‘yardstick’ category to ‘firm specific’ category. 
The firm is aware that lower investment leads to lower regulatory asset base and 
consequently lower return, and may, therefore, engage in strategic behaviour in pursuit 
of gold plating capital costs. 
 
Furthermore, as argued in Besanko and Spulber (1992), firms might choose a higher 
than optimal level of capital in order to persuade the regulator to allow higher operating 
costs and price on their product. Furthermore, Averch and Johnson (1962) showed that 
under this model, more capital will be employed by the regulated firm compared to a 
non-regulated firm, given any level of output. Additionally, from a practical point of 
view when the number of regulated companies are high (as in the case of Norway which 
are around 130 companies), scrutinising the investment plan of each individual firm 
might not be feasible considering the length of regulatory period. 
 
 
 
16  This approach is being practised in the UK in which the companies submit their business plan to the 
regulator before the next regulatory period to be examined and approved if justified. 
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Another approach that can be considered but needs further investigation is to use 
directional contraction of inputs where both operating and capital costs are part of the 
benchmarking practice. In this case the, the inputs are contracted only in the direction of 
operational expenditures assuming convexity between operational and capital 
expenditure as two inputs. This is in contrast with the current form of radial contraction 
of both inputs being used in benchmarking practice. However, the convexity constraint 
between operating and capital expenditures might not always hold in which case this 
approach can be problematic. Another possibility is to develop statistical approaches 
that allow for controlling inefficiency persistence due to investment so the firms are 
only penalised for the controllable part of their inefficiency evolution. At the same 
times, regulators need to ensure that approaches used to ease the process of investment 
and innovation will not lead to overcapitalisation. 
 
The area of dynamic efficiency under incentive regulation requires further research to 
address the issues of investment and innovation and also strike a balance between firms 
own information, sector information, investment incentives and possibility of over- and 
under-investment. Regulators also need to understand the long term consequences of the 
regulatory framework for investment and innovation and make informed decision 
regarding the way incentives are implemented. 
 
 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
The use of efficiency and productivity techniques such as total cost benchmarking, is 
becoming now common in incentive regulation to induce cost efficiency and prevent the 
firms  from  overcapitalisation.  However,   benchmarking  only  captures  short  run 
efficiency of network companies while they operate in a dynamic environment where 
technology, regulatory standards, demand and economic conditions are changing. In 
response  to  this,  the  utilities  reorganise  their  production  process  to  become  more 
efficient in the short run. 
 
However, the factors that affect short term efficiency of the firms (i.e. network outputs) 
may not be adjusted instantaneously when firms invest in new and costly technologies 
and practices which take time to produce result. Under this condition, in the short run, 
investment creates an induced inefficiency which persists for some time until the inputs 
and outputs are fully adjusted. On the other hand, the firms’ revenues, under incentive 
regulation, crucially depend on the level of efficiency achieved in the benchmarking 
process. 
 
The  current  form  of  incentives  regulation  with  ex-post  regulatory  treatment  of 
investment  employed  by  many  European  regulators  does  not  take  this  effect  into 
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account and, hence, there is a risk of financial loss for regulated companies when 
undertaking  investment.  Therefore,  the  simultaneous  incentives  for  investment  and 
static cost efficiency can send inconsistent signals to regulated firms. This potentially 
limits the companies’ incentives for investment and innovation. 
 
This paper analysed the concept of dynamic efficiency under incentives regulation with 
ex-post regulatory treatment of investment. We have shown that, in any given period, 
inefficiency of a firm consists of two components: the period-specific shocks and the 
carry-over from previous periods. The period specific inefficiency shocks can be created 
by investment or other factors that affect inefficiency and carry-over effect is due to 
inability of firms to adjust their inputs in a timely manner. Additionally, we estimated a 
dynamic stochastic frontier model in a Bayesian framework for a balanced panel of 128 
Norwegian electricity distribution companies from 2004 to 2010. 
 
The results show that, at the sector level, 92% of the efficiency to inefficiency ratio is 
transferred from one period to another. At the level of individual companies, however, 
the variation is significant. There are firms with very low or very high elasticity of 
inefficiency transmission. The high magnitude of elasticity causes the effect of the 
shocks to die out over a longer period. The distribution of inefficiency decomposition 
shows that except in 2004, the share of carry-over effects, in the observed level of 
firms’ inefficiency, is considerable. We have simulated the effect of a one-time shock 
on the autoregressive process and concluded that both the cumulative effect as well as 
the duration of inefficiency persistence will increase by the magnitude of initial 
perturbation. The results also indicate that the long run efficiency of the sector is 
approximately 82% based on the simple and correlated random effects models. 
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